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Abstract
Microfinance institutions are used to claim that their impact goes beyond money since 
rescuing  from  exclusion  uncollateralized  poor  borrowers  significantly  affects  their 
dignity, self-esteem, social recognition and, through it, life satisfaction. Our paper aims 
to verify indirectly this claim by evaluating whether access to microfinance loans has 
significant impact on life satisfaction beyond its indirect impact via income changes. 
Our empirical findings on a sample of poor borrowers in the suburbs of Buenos Aires 
show that, after controlling for survivorship bias, the number of credit cycles has a 
significant and positive effect on life satisfaction. 
Keywords: microfinance, happiness, impact study.
JEL codes: 
1. Introduction 
Successful development projects which rescue beneficiaries from marginalization and provide access to 
opportunities go beyond the provision of monetary resources since they end up healing in beneficiaries 
wounded  relationships  with  themselves  (restoration  of  dignity  and  self-esteem)  and  with  other 
members of the society (social recognition and reputation). 
Along this line many MFIs argue that lending to the uncollateralized poor living close to the poverty 
line has an impact which goes beyond the mere money concession.  This is well reflected in the main 
advertising statement of the Wordrelief organization claiming that:
“The world of microfinance opens the door of opportunity for the poor – providing the dignity and 
satisfaction that comes from working to support one’s family. Microfinance is about much more than just 
money. It helps create stability at home, teaches individuals how to thrive, and fosters self-respect and 
community well-being. Once empowered, men and women are able to support their families for a lifetime 
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– not  just  a  few  days  or  weeks.  It’s  the  difference  between  a  hand up  and  a  handout” 
(http://worldrelief.org/microfinance).
1
Are  these  claims  overstated?  In  order  to  give  an  answer  it  is  necessary  to  broaden  the  scope  of 
microfinance impact analyses by considering among performance variables not only standard economic 
(consumption, productivity, income per capita)  but also non pecuniary wellbeing indicators. 
This enhanced focus is important for at least four reasons.
First, the discussion on the relationship between income and happiness and, more generally, between 
subjective and objective wellbeing measures is always more at the center of the economic debate
2 and is 
relevant not only for highly industrialized countries but also for developing countries. This growing 
attention may be explained by the increasing awareness that social sustainability, local empowerment 
and active participation to development projects are fundamental for their success. In this perspective 
measuring  the  effects  of  similar  previous  projects  on  broader  concepts  of  wellbeing  may  help  to 
evaluate the local support and the probability of success of current and future initiatives beyond their 
expected income and economic effects. 
Second, findings from life satisfaction estimates can be a good complement of standard impact analyses 
since  they  are  able  to  capture  the  effect  of  relevant  (material  and  immaterial)  omitted  factors  on 
individual  wellbeing.  This  point    is  all  the  more  important  in  microfinance  where  a  loan  to  an 
uncollateralized  borrower  may  save  him  from  social  exclusion.  From  this  point  of  view  we  may 
conceive the capacity of an individual to contribute to social life and to create economic life as an 
“iceberg”. The smaller visible part (easier to investigate) is its productivity and its visible contribution to 
the creation of economic value in the society, while the larger part, made of dignity, self-esteem and 
social recognition is actually the invisible pillar of the former.
This  perspective  may  help  us  to  solve  some  microfinance  puzzles  such  as  the  surprisingly  high 
repayment  rates  despite  loans  are  generally  uncollateralised.  In  order  to  explain  the  paradox  the 
literature has emphasized so far the role of assortative matching (Murdoch 1999; Ghatak and Guinnane 
1999), peer monitoring in presence of group lending with joint liability (Armendariz, 1999; Stiglitz 1990; 
Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane 1994) and dynamic incentives  in presence of individual progressive 
loans (Wydick 1999; Karlan 2005a). Beyond these monetary incentive based rationales, the loss of the 
two “invisible pillars” (social recognition and self esteem) which may originate from non repayment 
may be enough to avoid moral hazard during the project, and strategic default after the end of it, when 
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2 Within this debate a line of thought argues that happiness indicators represent a unique, subjective and “non 
paternalistic” measure of wellbeing which cannot be suspected of imposition from external experts and should reflect the 
real desires (driven by individual tastes which may be idiosyncratic or conform to social norms) of those who are targets of a 
policy  intervention  (Sugden,  2008).  The  critique  to  this  position  is  well  expressed  by  the  “happy  slave  paradox”:  if 
individuals are so deprived of their rights, they may be in a condition of not even desire their emancipation and therefore 
remain satisfied of their condition of slavery (Sen, 2005).4
the social sanctions and the loss of dignity effects more than compensate the sums diverted from the 
bank.
From  this  point  of  view  our  analysis  on  the  effects  of  the  microfinance  loan  concession  on  life 
satisfaction helps us to quantify, net of the income effect, an extra non-pecuniary benefit which is an 
additional deterrent to opportunistic behavior as it may turn into a cost in case of non repayment. 
Third, further motivation for our study may come from the fact that the life satisfaction literature has 
started investigating the role of financial capabilities also in high income countries. From this point of 
view Taylor et al. (2009) document in their empirical analysis on the British Household Panel Survey 
that financial capability has a significant and positive impact on life satisfaction and health reducing by 
15 percent the possibility that an individual suffer from anxiety or depression. This implies that, if the 
same nexus holds also in poor countries, part of the microfinance effect on life satisfaction may be due 
to the enhanced financial capability (provided that the borrower successfully repays).
The fourth reason motivating our work is that another component (not fully captured by traditional 
quantitative indicators) in the overall effect of microfinance on life satisfaction may be its impact on 
trust and trustworthiness. First of all, the loan concession is an act of trust (after the verification of 
borrower qualities) on the borrower’s capacity to repay which has horizontal externality effects since it 
reveals to individuals living in the same geographical area the creditworthiness of the new borrower. 
This  signaling  effect  may  improve  relationships  with  neighbors  (Becchetti  and  Conzo,  2009)  and, 
through it, life satisfaction. 
3
Based on these considerations which help us to understand the multifaceted effects of microfinance 
(not all captured by traditional quantitative indicators) our paper aims to verify the microloans effect on 
the synthetic indicator of  borrower’s life satisfaction. To do so we perform an impact study on poor 
individuals living in the suburbs of Buenos Aires. Half of them are clients of Protagonizar (an MFI 
organization) and are heterogeneous in terms of length of the relationship (credit cycle). The other half 
of the sample is made of a control group of individuals living in the same area and being eligible 
according to the Protagonizar standards for creditworthiness.
                                                
3 Consider however that part of this enhanced trustworthiness may also have sound economic effects since, in a 
framework of contract incompleteness, many aspects of business relationships may be modeled under the form of an 
investment  game  (Berg,  Dickhaut  and  McCabe,  1995).  More  specifically,  the  relationships  between  business  partners, 
between an entrepreneur and her partners generally assume a sequential structure. One of the two players takes the initiative 
first by sharing something (knowledge, physical or financial assets) and, after it, the counterpart may decide whether to do 
the same or to abuse of the trust of the first mover. As in the typical investment game the counterparts joint decision to 
share (the trustor) and not to abuse (the trustee) has superadditive effects and a higher outcome than the two suboptimal 
equilibria in which the first player shares and is abused or the first player decides not to share because she is afraid of the 
risk of being abused. As a consequence, enhanced reputation has monetary but also non monetary effects. 5
Our main finding is the identification of strong and significant correlation between progression into the 
borrower-MFI relationship and life satisfaction, net of the effect on the latter of household income and 
after controlling for survivorship and selection bias. Our interpretation is that this finding captures all 
those positive MFI effects which do not materialize into current income (such as future perspectives 
arising from current investment, social recognition, self esteem, etc.). 
The paper is divided into five sections (introduction and conclusions included). In the second section 
we shortly summarize the literature on life satisfaction with specific reference to studies in developing 
countries. In the third section we briefly describe the characteristics of the MFI under scrutiny. In the 
fourth section we illustrate our survey design and present descriptive statistics. In the fifth section we 
comment our econometric findings. The sixth section concludes. 
2. Shall we rely life satisfaction results ?
Starting from the well known Easterlin  (1974) paradox which documented the decoupling between the 
dynamics of  per  capita  income  and  happiness  in the  postwar  US,  the  economic  literature  on  the 
determinants of life satisfaction has flourished with an increasing number of published contributions 
(for a similar conclusion see also Schor, 1991; Frank, 1985 and Scitowsky, 1976).
4 More in general, and 
beyond the provocation of the paradox, the interest in this strand of the literature arises from the desire 
to test empirically the undemonstrated assumptions about the shape of utility functions which are at the 
basis of economic models once a wide array of large databases including information on self declared 
life satisfaction has become available.
5
The life satisfaction empirical literature has examined the relationship between happiness and several 
determinants such as income (see, among others, Easterlin, 1995 and 2000; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Di 
Tella et al. 2005 Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Frijters, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005 and Clark et al., 2005), employment  status (Winkelmann 
and Winkelmann, 1998), marital status (Argyle, 1999; Johnson-Wu, 2002; Blanchflower- Oswald, 2004; 
Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, b, 2006), unemployment and inflation (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Gallie and 
Russell, 1998; Di Tella et al., 2001, 2003) and many other factors.
                                                
4 Evidence supporting the paradox is also reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) for the UK,  Frey and 
Stutzer (2002b) on a large sample of countries using data from the World Database of Happiness and the U.S. Bureau of 
Census and Veenhoven (1993) for Japan over the period 1958-1987. In spite of it, the Easterlin paradox is not in itself a 
regularity  always  confirmed  across  countries  and  time.  When  Castriota  (2006)  repeats  the  Easterlin  exercise  on 
Eurobarometer data for some European countries in the last decade he actually finds that the paradox applies to Germany 
but not to Italy where a quite strong positive relationship between the happiness and per capita income is found.
5 Even though the question whether life satisfaction responses measure flow or lifetime utility is still open, life 
satisfaction measures still represent the closest empirical proxies to the standard utility concept in economic theories.6
Life satisfaction studies are also of practical interest since they reveal themselves very useful for 
estimating  with  approaches  such  as  the  compensating  surplus,  the  shadow  value  of  several  non 
marketable goods such as air quality and pollution (Welsch, 2002 and  2006), airport noise (Van Praag 
and Baarsma, 2005),  terrorism (Frey  et  al., 2007),  the fear of  crime  (Moore and Shepherd,  2006), 
marriage  (Johnson  and  Wu,  2002;  Blanchflower  and  Oswald,  2004;  Frey  and  Stutzer,  2006)  and 
unemployment (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Gallie and Russell, 1998; Di Tella et al., 2001 and  2003).
From  a methodological point of view life satisfaction has been measured either as a short run reaction 
to daily events (momentary affect) with the diary method (Kahneman et al., 2006) or as an overall 
evaluation of one’s own satisfaction about life considering all its aspect. The largest part of empirical 
contributions has followed this second direction considering that a clearer evaluation of one’s own 
satisfaction requires the contribution of a (delayed in time) inner resounding of lived experiences. 
The use of this survey information on respondents’ evaluation about the overall quality of their life is 
not free of methodological problems well discussed in this literature – i.e. the signal on the inner state 
of the respondent mixed with the noise caused by the current affect (Schwarz and Strack,1999), the 
intercomparability of ordinal scales across different cultures, etc.). In spite of these problems there is 
substantial  evidence  that  life  satisfaction  passed  a  series  of  validation  and  reliability  studies  (for 
references see Frey and Stutzer, 2002). One of these validations is the strong documented relationship 
between self declared life satisfaction and different measures of health (Alesina et al., 2004).  
2.1 Life satisfaction studies in developing countries 
While  most  empirical  studies  on  life  satisfaction  investigate  the  problem  in  highly  industrialised 
countries, research on the effects of development projects not just on economic indicators but also on 
broader concepts of wellbeing and life satisfaction is still lagging behind. In the last decade however 
several authors have urged to bridge this gap by emphasizing that the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative wellbeing indicators can yield important additional insights also in the case of development 
studies (Herrera et al., 2006; Ravallion and Loskin, 2002a and 2002b and Narayan et al., 2000a and 
2000b). More specifically, since inclusion processes involve important non economic effects (on self-
esteem, dignity, social recognition), while changes in  economic conditions have indirect  effects on 
population  cultures  and  habits,  the  broader  wellbeing  effect  of  development  policies  may  be, 
respectively,  larger  or  smaller  than  the  traditionally  measured  economic  one.  Furthermore,  life 
satisfaction  indicators  may  help  to  measure  shadow  values  of  non  market  goods  for  the  affected 
populations  and  the  real  distribution  of  benefits  of  a  given  policy  program  among  different 
stakeholders. In this respect Rojas (2008) analyses the intra-household distribution of health satisfaction 7
and identifies in this way gender inequalities which can be due to  cultural discrimination and bargaining 
in family arrangements.
A typical finding of life satisfaction studies in developing countries, when compared with those in high 
income countries, is the confirmation of the concave life satisfaction-income hypothesis and of the 
implied Law of Decreasing Marginal Utility
2, one of the basic tenets of the standard economic theory 
formulated well before the availability of data for empirical testing.
From this point of view  Herrera et al. (2006) compare Madagascar and Peru, and document that the 
correlation between subjective wellbeing and income is stronger in poorer environments. A similar 
result is obtained by Becchetti et al. (2009) comparing the life satisfaction effect of affiliation Fair Trade 
in two areas with markedly different standard of living. In the same direction Becchetti and Castriota 
(2009) illustrate how exogenous shocks on income, such as the “negative lottery” of the tsunami, and 
the  subsequent  project  to  recapitalise  microfinance  institutions,  determine  changes  in  the  life 
satisfaction of the borrowers hit by the catastrophe which appear stronger than those observed with 
parallel exogenous shocks in rich countries (Gardner and Oswald, 2004; Frijters et al., 2004).
A second peculiarity of determinants of life satisfaction in developing countries is that we generally 
observe a more positive reaction to income inequality than in high income countries (Herrera et al., 
2006)  since  wellbeing  improvements  by  peers  are  interpreted  as  increased  opportunities  for  social 
mobility. This is consistent with what observed in transition countries, in which Hirschman’s (1973) 
tunnel effect generally prevails over the negative impact of inequality because (Senik, 2004).
Within  this  literature  we  aim  to  extend  the  use  of  life  satisfaction  measures  of  the  impact  of 
development projects to initiatives explicitly designed to promote inclusion and credit access such as 
microfinance. We hope in this way to open a new strand in this literature by testing for the existence of 
the immaterial (psychological and social) benefits of inclusion which add value to microfinance projects  
beyond their direct economic effects.
3. Protagonizar 
The help we received from Protagonizar was enormous. I felt that not everything was lost. On some 
occasions we tried to get a bank loan but they asked for a credit card and wages receipt; impossible. 
Here instead ,we go with our word, they believe and trust us. This is beautiful and I feel we are not 
alone.8
Protagonizar is a young microfinance organization (with 6 years of life) providing uncollateralized loans 
to  small  microentrepreneurs  engaged  in  activities  such  as  bakeries,  textile  enterprises,  beehives  or 
basketworks. 
A specificity of this organization is that of operating in a well circumscribed area (the three districts of 
Santa Brigida, Villa de Mayo and Barrio Mitre and in the suburbs of Buenos Aires). This choice determines 
low operative costs and makes it feasible an approach of personalized attention to the borrowers. A 
group of motivated volunteers working together with the paid professional staff members support the 
microfinance institution. 
With regard to lending mechanisms, Protagonizar originally followed a path which goes in the opposite 
direction with respect to that of the Grameen bank, starting with staggered individual credits and moving 
almost entirely, after its first period of life, to a group lending mechanism with full joint liability. 
The  staggered  individual  credit  mechanism consists  of  forming  a  group  of  three  entrepreneurs  with 
independent  projects  (who,  differently  from  the  Grameen  and  many  other  examples,  can  also be 
connected by family ties) and lending sequentially to each member of the group, conditional to the 
repayment of the member who borrows before.
The  group  lending  credit requires  the  creation  of  groups  of  4-6  individuals  which  receive  their  loan 
simultaneously. There is full joint liability among members since, when one of them is unable to repay, 
the groupmates are called to cover in full that amount. 
Under both (staggered individual and group) lending approaches, administrative costs charged by the 
Foundation are 5 percent monthly over the debt balance against an average lending rate charged by 
moneylenders in the three villas of around 50 percent monthly.
The  following  eligibility  criteria  are  required  to  obtain  the  loan:  i)  a  minimum  of  six  month 
entrepreneurial experience; ii) absence of family ties between groupmates, iii) maximum living distance 
of  three  blocks  among  group  components  and  iv)  (in  order  to  diversify  risk  within  the  group) 
diversification of business activities (only one street vendor per group). Note also that the money of the 
group is not given individually but to the coordinator of the group (one of the group members) who 
distributes it to the other and collect the installments to pay to the lender.
It is  important  to  remark  that the Protagonizar  group  lending  system  has  a  three-sided  screening 
process on the prospective borrower. The organization evaluates both the payment capacity of the 
client and the  consideration  that other Protagonizar borrowers (which are  not  part of his lending 
group)  have  of  him.  The  group  lending  mechanism  induces  assortative  matching  so  that,  for 
groupmate-neighbours trust on the borrower is not just declared in words but must be demonstrated 
by accepting a joint liability. 9
4. The research design
To assess the impact of microfinance participation on a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators, we 
develop an empirical analysis based on survey data. From June to September 2009 a questionnaire has 
been delivered to 360 micro-entrepreneurs located in proximity of the three agencies of Protagonizar 
(Santa Brigida, Barrio Mitre and Villa de Mayo) by two teams composed by one researcher and one 
field assistant each
6.   
From a list of all the Protagonizar's clients we randomly select 150 borrowers (in equal proportion from 
Barrio Mitre and Santa Brigida) equally representing new and veteran clients
7. We use the credit cycle 
information (while not the time distance from the first loan) for the definition of borrowers' seniority 
since the former is better suited to proxy for borrowers' quality in terms of solvency. As a control 
sample,  from  the  three  areas  of  interest  we  randomly  choose  150  eligible  non  participants micro-
entrepreneurs who were not borrowers (neither of Protagonizar nor of any other MFIs) at the moment 
of the interview. In addition, we also create a sample of 60 Protagonizar’s former borrowers who 
dropped out from the program.
8
Following the standard notation in the impact analysis literature, the group composed by the 150 MFI 
borrowers will be referred to as the treatment group, whereas the one by 150 eligible non-participants as 
the control group. The selection of control group members according to the eligibility criteria allows us to 
reduce the potential heterogeneity between MFI and non-MFI individuals, thus moderating the impact 
of  the  selection  bias in  our  quasi-experimental  framework.  Moreover,  by  also  including  drop-out 
borrowers in our study we reduce the effects on our estimates of the survivorship bias (Alexander and 
Karlan, 2009).
5. Descriptive findings
Descriptive statistics (Tables 2 and 3) document that the average schooling level is quite low (8.4 years) 
and that of the respondent partner is even lower (5.8 years). Average monthly household income is 
4,096 pesos while median income is 3,000 pesos. This implies that half of sample household lives with 
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7 Borrowers' seniority is evaluated according to their credit-cycle. Since borrowers must first reimburse the previous 
loan in order to ask for a new one, a higher credit cycle is a proxy of a better borrower's repayment record. Given a median 
credit-cycle of 17, borrowers with a credit-cycle higher then or equal to 17 are categorized as "veteran" while borrowers with 
a credit-cycle below the median as "new". 
8 We selected a number of dropouts from each area which is proportional to the historical exit rates of  borrowers 
from the organization.10
around 100 pesos (5 euros) per day. Since the number of members of the household is around 4, 
interviewed individuals live on with roughly 12.29 PPP US$  per day.
9
The average amount of last monthly repayment for the microfinance loan among MF borrowers is 108 
pesos, that is, 27 percent of median income.
In spite of  it  around 20  percent of  income  is saved.  Respondents have  no temporary employees. 
Average total productivity (considering main and other jobs) is around 17 pesos per hour.
When we decompose the sample in three groups (clients, eligible non participants and dropouts) we 
find that eligible non participants and dropouts have on average 73 and 60 percent of the monthly 
average household income of MF borrowers (the difference in means is significant at 95 percent with 
dropouts and not so with eligible borrowers). However the Wilcoxon non parametric test shows that 
clients and dropouts have on average higher household income than eligible non participants (Table 3).
Productivity is 21 pesos per hour worked against 16 pesos of eligible non participants and 13 pesos of 
dropouts (again the difference in means is significant at 95 percent with dropouts and not so with 
eligible borrowers). 
Interestingly, MF borrowers and dropouts have a significantly higher number of children than eligible 
non participants. 
The distribution of life satisfaction for the different groups shows none of the respondents declares 
level below 3 and that the frequency of MF borrowers giving answers from 7 to 10 is higher than that 
of the other groups (see Figure 1).  The average level of self declared life satisfaction is significantly 
higher for MF borrowers than for eligible non participants (8.62 against   8.14). Life satisfaction of 
dropouts is in the middle and not significantly different from that of MF borrowers. The Wilcoxon non 
parametric test documents that clients and dropouts have on average a significantly higher level of life 
satisfaction than eligible non participants (Table 3).
6. Econometric findings 
To analyse the effect of MFI participation on life satisfaction we estimate the following specification:
                                                
9 During the survey period (July-Sept. 2009), the average malnutrition and poverty thresholds are set by the INDEC 
(National Statistical Agency of Argentina) at 4.88 and 11.04 pesos/day respectively, which are in turn equivalent to 3.84 and
8.70 PPP –US$ according the PPP country’s factor evaluated by the World Bank in 2005. When considering the country’s 
implied PPP factor in 2009 (US$ 2.033, source: IMF), both the malnutrition and poverty lines fall to 2.40 and 5.43 PPP-US$ 
per day respectively. Consider however that several authors consider Argentinean poverty lines grossly undervalued do a 
downward bias in computing domestic inflation. As an example consider that one of the most known independent research 
centers, Ecolatina,  estimates prices rose 65 percent from Dec. 1, 2006, to July 31, 2009, compared with the 20 percent 





e the dependent variable   is reported in  an ordinal  scale, life  satisfaction regressions  are generally 
estimated with an ordered probit or logit. Van Praag and Ferrer–i–Carbonell (2004 and 2006) however 
show that the simple linear models are as good as the Probit and Logit method
10, but computationally 
much easier.
11For this reason we will propose both OLS and ordered probit estimates in order to check 
the robustness to estimating techniques of each model specification. 
Our first specification includes all traditional regressors used in life satisfaction estimates (age, gender, 
marital status, employment status, village, household income, number of household members, wealth proxies) without 
any variable  measuring  the  microfinance impact  (MFI).  More  specifically,  Age is respondent’s  age; 
Female is the gender dummy taking value of one if the respondent is female and zero otherwise; marital 
status dummies in the Marstatus group include Married, Widowed, Divorced, Cohabitant; Wealth Dummies
include possession of a ceramic floor, of a brick-finished house and of a private indoor toilette; Village 
Dummies control for the area the interviewee belongs to (S. Brigida, Mitre, Villa de Mayo);  Schooling is 
the number of schooling years; Hcomponents is the number of household components and Hincome is 
household income.  
We will  estimate the  model  for  the overall  sample  (Table 4)  and  for  the  sample  of  microfinance 
borrowers only (Table 5).
Our findings on the overall sample show that the only significant variables (with positive effect) are 
household income and the married and cohabiting status (Table 4, columns 1 and 2). 
In a second specification we exclude the drop-out sub-sample and introduce the MF customer status 
dummy (client) which is equal to one if the interviewee is a MF borrower. The variable is strongly 
significant and the effect of income vanishes.
12
As it is well known, the calculation of the marginal effect of a change in a regressor on the probability 
of declaring oneself very happy in the ordered probit estimate is obtained with the following formula: 
                                                
10 Van Praag (2007 p. 18) simply argues that “All these specifications amount to different specifications of the labeling system of the 
underlying indifference curves, but the indifference curves themselves are unchanged and are these indifference curves which are estimated, either by 
Ordered Probit, Logit or what else.”
11 For a robustness check with random effect ordered probit see section 6.
12 Consider that the correlation between the two variables is of 7.5 percent with the dummy including both MFI 
borrowers and dropouts and 15 percent with the dummy including MFI borrowers only).
LifeSatisfactioni  0  1Agei  2Femalei  3kMarstatusik
k   4lWealthdummiesik
l  
 5mVillagedummiesik 
m  6JobExpi  7Schoolingi  8Hcomponentsi  9Savingsi 
10Hincome i12
where F is the cumulative normal distribution, S the predicted average satisfaction level and c the 
highest cutpoint. By applying this formula we find that the MF borrower status raises by 12 percent the 
probability of declaring the highest life satisfaction score (Table 6).
Obviously,  such  a specification  is  fully  subject  to  selection  bias  which  is  even  more  severe  in 
microfinance  studies.
13Is  the  nexus  between  life  satisfaction  and  the  borrower  status  driven  by 
participation to microfinance or is it pre-existent and due to heterogeneous characteristics between 
treatment  and  control  sample?  In  this  second  case  a  reverse  causality  nexus  applies:  individuals 
endowed with specific personality traits (assertiveness, sociability, etc.) are both happier and more likely 
to be successful in their job. Such individuals are thus more prone to receive a micro-loan and, by 
considering them as the treatment group, the impact of MF participation might be overestimated. Note 
as well that the presence of a selection bias, by overestimating the effect of the treatment on the 
treated, leads to wrong policy conclusions on its effectiveness.
In  essence,  the  argument  for  the  endogeneity  between  income  and  happiness  applies  also  to  the 
relationship between life satisfaction and MF borrower status. 
As a partial solution to the heterogeneity problem between treatment and control sample consider 
however that control sample individuals are chosen among those eligible as Protagonizar customers. 
They therefore live in the same three barrios, have income which falls in the category of potential MFI 
borrowers and have started an economic activity since at least 6 months. Finally, only one out of six of 
them is a street vendor (see eligilibity criteria in section…). 
A second problem which prevents us from interpreting our result in the second specification as a pure
microfinance effect is the survivorship bias. What we observe are only successful borrowers (those for 
which the loan, the ex-post economic performance and, presumably, life  satisfaction are positively 
correlated). However the initial pool of borrowers included also those who failed at a given credit cycle 
and therefore terminated their relationship with the MFI. This second group of initial borrowers is 
more likely to register a non positive nexus between the microfinance loan, economic success and life 
satisfaction.  In order to have an evaluation of the impact of microfinance which mitigates survivorship 
bias, we create a dummy taking value of one for both current microfinance borrowers and dropouts. 
Results from this third specification document that the MFI borrower status effect on life satisfaction 
does not disappear when we take into account survivorship bias (Table 4, columns 5 and 6). The 
magnitude of the effect is just slightly reduced since the MFI borrower or dropout status raises by 11 
percent the probability of declaring the highest level of life satisfaction.
                                                
13 Among the first microfinance papers dealing with these issues see Hulme and Mosley (1996), Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) and Coleman (1999).
Pr(VerySatisfied)  F(S  S  c)  F(S  c)13
As a fourth specification, in order to reduce heterogeneity between treatment and control group we 
estimate the model on the treatment group only by using the number of credit cycles as proxy of the 
microfinance effect. Note that we can restrict our analysis on the treatment group only since we have a 
non dichotomous measure of the treatment, that is the number of cycles. Here again, we find a strong
positive effect of the number of credit cycles with life satisfaction (Table 5, columns 1 and 2). With 
regard to economic significance we find that a unit increase in the credit cycle from its sample mean 
increases the probability of declaring oneself at the higher level of life satisfaction by 1 percent. We can 
therefore conclude that the length of the relationship with the lender makes borrowers happier beyond 
current income which is also included as regressor. The result persists when we include dropouts in the 
sample even though its magnitude is weaker (the quantitative effect is reduced to 0.5 percent) (Table 5, 
columns 3 and 4). 
Among the possible interpretations (widely discussed in the previous section) for this findings we may 
consider the expected effect of the financed investment on future income, the nonmonetary benefit of 
the increased self-esteem and social reputation, the enjoyment of the higher social capital lived in terms 
of increased trust and trustworthiness in interpersonal relationships. 
Consider  that  when  we  use  the  credit  seniority  variable  it  is  not  fully  possible  to  control  for 
survivorship bias since dropouts interrupt their relationship and therefore have on average a lower 
number of credit cycles. However when looking at life satisfaction and not at income survivorship bias 
is not so problematic.
If in terms of income the inclusion of non survivors eliminates a positive effect this implies that, overall 
a given treatment has not increased income. If the same occurs in case of happiness we can say that 
happiness is higher for those who are so able to persist and survive but not if we consider also those 
who did not survived.
Another typical objection which may be raised on a survey measuring the effects of MF on happiness is 
that microfinance borrowers may feel themselves obliged to declare higher happiness levels if they 
figure that the MF institution may in some way check their answers. We however find that our result is 
robust to the inclusion of dropouts which should not feel the same obligation. In addition to it, it is 
hard to believe that the number of credit cycle effect may be interpreted in the sense that the interview 
bias is growing proportionally with the number of successful loans. 
7. Conclusions14
The process of inclusion of marginalised producers generated by a microfinance loan implies more than 
a simple improvement of economic conditions induced by the opportunity of financing a productive 
investment. 
Rescue from poverty involves relevant non income (or non economic) effects arising from a process of 
“dignification”  which  increases  self-esteem  and  social  recognition  of  the  financed  borrower.  As  a 
consequence,  we  expect  thatwhen  measuring  the  impact  of  microfinance  program  on  a  broader 
concept of wellbeing such as life satisfaction, such impact has an independent effect not absorbed by 
the change in income generated by the loan. 
Our results support this hypothesis of a relevant microfinance effect independent of income showing 
its  robustness to  survivorship  bias  and  its  sensitivity  to  the  number  of  credit  cycles. Actually,  we 
observe  that,  in  spite  of  a  low  correlation  between  participation  to  the  microfinance  project  and 
household income, when adding the MFI borrower status to the standard life satisfaction estimate the 
effect of household income disappears. This suggests that non income effects absorbed by the MFI 
status variable are crucial to generate the positive effect of the program on life satisfaction.
Unfortunately, it is impossible with the available data to assess which non income factors explain our 
findings. We argue that potential candidates are self-esteem, social recognition, improved expectations 
on future economic perspectives and enhanced trust and trustworthiness but the incidence of other 
unmeasured factors cannot be excluded and is left to future research.15
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Description of the main variables 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Age Age of the respondent.
Household Income - Hincome Monthly respondent’s and partner’s income from I and II activities.
Household Food expenditure Daily expenditure in food for the family.
Total Productivity Monthly productivity measured by the ratio of  respondent’s + partner’s 
income from I and II activities and the average number of hours worked.
Job Experience (years) - JobExp Years of experience in the main respondent’s activity. 
Savings/month -  Savings Monthly savings generated.
Distance from MFI Distance from the closer Protagonizar’s local office (in cuadras; 1 cuadra = 
130 m. approximately).
Distance from main road Distance from the closer main route of commerce (usually, the closer 
asphalted road) -  in cuadras; 1 cuadra = 130 m. approximately.
Life-Satisfaction Respondent’s general life satisfaction captured by the question “how happy do 
you consider yourself with your life” [from 0 to 10].
House satisfaction Respondent’s satisfaction about house conditions captured by the question 
“how happy do you consider yourself with the condition of your house” [from 0 to 10].
Self-esteem Respondent’s self-esteem captured by the question “how much do you consider 
yourself a good worker” [from 0 to 10].
N. of persons in the house - Hcomponents Total n. of components in the house.
N. of children N. of children living in and outside the respondent’s house.
Schooling years (Respondent) - Schooling Respondent’s total n. of schooling years (included repetitions).
Schooling years (Partner) Partner’s total n. of schooling years (included repetitions).
Credit cycle Cycle of current credit.
Total amount of last microcredit received Amount of the last loan asked and received.
Amount of last repayement Amount of the last installment.
Duration of the microcredit (weeks) Duration of last micro-loan received (in weeks)
Indoor private toilette - Toilette Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent’s house enjoys private and complete 
toilette (not-shared).  
Ceramic Floor - CeramicFloor Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent’s house enjoys a ceramic floor.
Brick Finished House- BrickFinished Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent’s house is finished and made of 
bricks and concrete.
N. of Bedrooms- Bedrooms N. of bedrooms in the respondent’s house.
Female Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent is female and 0 otherwise.
Widow Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent is widow.
Divorced Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent is divorced.
Married Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent is married.
Cohabitant Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent is cohabitant.
Villa de Mayo Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent lives in Villa de Mayo district.
S. Brigida Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent lives in S. Brigida district.
Client Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent is a borrower of Protagonizar.
Clients&Drops Dummy variable = 1 for present borrowers (Clients) and former borrowers 
(Dropouts) of Protagonizar 20
Table 1 - Summary statistics of Socio-Demographic and Economic Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 361 43.19114 12.74666 17 79
Household Income 361 4096.097 4922.754 150 65000
Household Food expenditure 361 38.85286 30.12302 6.666667 400
Total Productivity 361 17.3678 22.59894 0 312.5
Productivity from I activity (Respondent) 361 11.06951 18.97678 0 312.5
Productivity from II activity (Respondent) 361 2.226235 8.611873 0 125
Productivity from I activity (Partner) 361 4.04512 6.653818 0 66.66666
Productivity from II activity (Partner) 361 0.0269314 0.3932752 0 6.944445
Job Experience (years) 349 8.340974 8.728824 0.6 50
Savings/month 361 186.0295 525.4139 0 5000
Distance from MFI* 361 16.77701 13.89867 0 120
Distance from main road* 361 1.285319 2.601609 0 25
Life-Satisfaction 360 8.390278 1.38929 3 10
House satisfaction 360 7.836111 1.771274 0 10
Self-esteem 360 9.048611 1.220643 4 10
N. of persons in the house 359 4.247911 1.920876 1 15
N. of children 361 2.99169 2.135009 0 13
Schooling years (Respondent) 359 8.477716 3.054131 1 18
Schooling years (Partner) 361 5.587258 4.503548 0 18
Credit cycle 361 6.614958 8.687712 0 26
Total amount of last microcredit received 209 1086.158 647.1381 150 3000
Amount of last repayement 209 108.3245 64.54202 11 354
Duration of the microcredit (weeks) 209 10.85167 3.185304 4 30
Indoor private toilette 361 0.7368421     0.4409586 0 1
Ceramic Floor 361 0.565097     0.4964323 0 1
Brick Finished House 361 0.4598338     0.4990758 0 1
N. of Bedrooms 361 2.204986 1.025821 0 921
Table 2 -Summary statistics for eligible non participants, clients and drop-outs
Eligible non participants Clients Drop-outs
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval Obs Mean Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval Obs Mean Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval
Age 152 43.68421 1.104722 41.5015    45.86692 150 42.53333 0.9579838 40.64034    44.42632 59 43.59322 1.697304 40.1957    46.99074
Household Income 152 3662.599 462.1428 2749.497      4575.7 150 4982.687 387.5127 4216.956    5748.417 59 2958.864 266.5228 2425.361    3492.368
Household Food expenditure 152 42.29793 3.249835 35.87691    48.71895 150 35.89159 1.725943 32.4811    39.30207 59 37.50605 2.055087 33.39235    41.61976
Total Productivity 152 15.79351 2.223757 11.39981    20.18721 150 20.60705 1.636741 17.37283    23.84127 59 13.1882 1.480573 10.22451    16.15189
Productivity from I activity (Respondent) 152 10.34208 2.111818 6.169552    14.51461 150 12.75111 0.9573707 10.85933    14.64288 59 8.668322 1.318832 6.028393    11.30825
Productivity from II activity (Respondent) 152 2.131734 0.5867983 .9723387     3.29113 150 2.92921 0.9037184 1.14345    4.714969 59 0.6824724 0.3089192 .0641034    1.300841
Productivity from I activity (Partner) 152 3.319697 0.4336696 2.462853    4.176541 150 4.861917 0.6576364 3.562419    6.161415 59 3.837402 0.719836 2.396494    5.278311
Productivity from II activity (Partner) 152 0 0 150 0.0648148 0.0497471 -.0334861   .1631158 59 0 0 0           0
Job Experience (years) 152 7.447368 0.684113 6.095699    8.799038 147 9.390476 0.7362667 7.935359    10.84559 50 7.972 1.253365 5.45327    10.49073
N. of temporary employess 152 0.0263158 0.0130265 .000578    .0520536 150 0.06 0.0254358 .0097385    .1102615 59 0 0 0           0
Savings/month 152 78.48684 25.43209 28.23815    128.7355 150 313.8444 57.65782 199.9118    427.7771 59 138.1356 41.49351 55.07732    221.1939
Distancia from main road 152 0.7927632 0.1110844 .5732826    1.012244 150 1.77 0.2964982 1.184116    2.355884 59 1.322034 0.1844173 .9528825    1.691185
Life-Satisfaction 151 8.142384 0.1221928 7.900943    8.383825 150 8.623333 0.097386 8.430897    8.815769 59 8.432203 0.1912987 8.049277    8.815129
House-satisfaction 151 7.728477 0.1505498 7.431005    8.025949 150 7.92 0.1384704 7.646381    8.193619 59 7.898305 0.2302324 7.437445    8.359165
Self esteem 151 8.983444 0.1008154 8.784242    9.182645 150 9.096667 0.1016306 8.895843     9.29749 59 9.09322 0.1457936 8.801383    9.385058
N. of persons in the house 150 4.013333 0.1608108 3.695569    4.331098 150 4.44 0.1529662 4.137737    4.742263 59 4.355932 0.2450715 3.865368    4.846496
N.of children 152 2.519737 0.1600503 2.20351    2.835964 150 3.253333 0.169797 2.917812    3.588854 59 3.542373 0.3182745 2.905277    4.179469
Schooling years (Respondent) 150 8.9 0.2614278 8.383415    9.416585 150 8.403333 0.2370445 7.93493    8.871736 59 7.59322 0.3753966 6.841782    8.344658
Schooling years (Partner) 152 5.828947 0.3903659 5.057663    6.600232 150 5.28 0.3360675 4.615926    5.944074 59 5.745763 0.6056394 4.533444    6.958082
Indoor private toilette 152 0.7894737 0.0331767 .7239231    .8550242 150 0.74 0.0359343 .6689933    .8110067 59 0.5932203 0.0645021 .4641054    .7223353
Brick Finished House 152 0.4802632 0.0406577 .3999317    .5605946 150 0.44 0.0406656 .3596442    .5203558 59 0.4576271 0.065417 .3266807    .5885735
N. of Bedrooms 152 2.144737 0.0926019 1.961774    2.327699 150 2.26 0.0782527 2.105372    2.414628 59 2.220339 0.1135676 1.993009    2.447669
Ceramic floor 152 0.5986842 0.039889 .5198715    .6774969 150 0.5466667 0.0407828 .4660793     .627254 59 0.5254237 0.0655683 .3941745    .6566729
Credit cycle 150 15.76 0.4911458 14.78949    16.73051
Total amount of last microcredit received 150 1209.513 52.15598 1106.452    1312.574
Amount of last repayement 150 121.1681 5.290582 110.7139    131.6224
Duration of the microcredit (weeks) 150 10.84 0.1938841 10.45688    11.2231222
Figure 1 Distribution of life satisfaction (full sample, MF borrower, dropouts, eligible non 
participants)
Table 2. Non parametric tests on differences in life satisfaction between groups
Test type z- stat p-value
Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test on life 
satisfaction: clients and dropouts vs. eligible non 
participants. -2.663 (0.0077)
Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test on household’s 
income: clients and dropouts vs. eligible non 
participants. -3.974 (0.0001)23
Table 4 - The determinants of life satisfaction for MFI and non MFI borrowers
Dep. Var.: LifeSatisfaction OLS OPROBIT OLS OPROBIT OLS OPROBIT
1 2 3 4 5 6
Age -0.00109 -0.000773 -0.00964 -0.00830 -0.00199 -0.00162
(0.00762) (0.00593) (0.00896) (0.00697) (0.00760) (0.00595)
Female 0.142 0.0728 0.0744 0.0230 0.0951 0.0361
(0.173) (0.132) (0.191) (0.146) (0.171) (0.131)
Widow 0.402 0.309 0.561 0.472 0.488 0.380
(0.360) (0.274) (0.411) (0.319) (0.372) (0.285)
Divorced -0.129 -0.0387 -0.273 -0.104 -0.0903 -0.00310
(0.794) (0.536) (0.924) (0.637) (0.810) (0.547)
Married 0.505** 0.391*** 0.486** 0.422*** 0.545*** 0.434***
(0.200) (0.147) (0.210) (0.161) (0.196) (0.147)
Cohabitant 0.586*** 0.426*** 0.455* 0.349* 0.590*** 0.435***
(0.214) (0.163) (0.232) (0.182) (0.214) (0.164)
Toilette 0.339* 0.266* 0.255 0.197 0.375* 0.296**
(0.204) (0.151) (0.227) (0.169) (0.201) (0.151)
CeramicFloor -0.0789 -0.0826 -0.0268 -0.0240 -0.0694 -0.0742
(0.180) (0.139) (0.198) (0.154) (0.179) (0.139)
BrickFinished 0.0849 0.0674 0.0518 0.0484 0.0683 0.0577
(0.157) (0.125) (0.169) (0.136) (0.154) (0.124)
Savings 0.000138 0.0000978 0.0000795 0.00005.29 0.0000832 0.0000518
(0.000108) (0.0000869) (0.000119) (0.0000970) (0.000113) (0.0000906)
JobExp -0.00512 -0.00532 -0.0124 -0.0110 -0.00636 -0.00643
(0.00929) (0.00725) (0.0104) (0.00832) (0.00921) (0.00725)
Bedrooms 0.0339 0.0193 0.0532 0.0402 0.0322 0.0198
(0.0815) (0.0634) (0.0803) (0.0623) (0.0805) (0.0627)
Villa de Mayo -0.382 -0.219 -0.113 0.00598 -0.104 0.0121
(0.283) (0.202) (0.321) (0.231) (0.312) (0.223)
S. Brigida -0.0161 -0.0179 -0.0234 -0.0162 0.0255 0.0169
(0.149) (0.118) (0.163) (0.133) (0.151) (0.120)
Schooling -0.0215 -0.0250 -0.0249 -0.0262 -0.0183 -0.0229
(0.0270) (0.0212) (0.0295) (0.0235) (0.0269) (0.0212)
Hincome 0.0000191** 0.0000209* 0.0000126 0.0000135 0.00000783 0.0000179
(0.00000905) (0.0000108) (0.0000116) (0.0000122) (0.0000152) (0.0000112)
Hcomponents 0.0201 0.0221 -0.00823 -0.00233 0.0128 0.0156





Observations 360 360 301 301 360 360
R-squared 0.070 0.0215 0.086 0.0277 0.085 0.0272
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the specifications consider the whole sample except spec. 3 and 4 for which drop-outs are not included24
Table 5 - The determinants of life satisfaction for MFI borrowers only
Dep. Var.: LifeSatisfaction OLS OPROBIT OLS OPROBIT
7 8 9 10
Age -0.0201* -0.0226** -0.00424 -0.00551
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.00860) (0.00791)
Female 0.0535 0.0708 0.0814 0.0568
(0.236) (0.223) (0.202) (0.180)
Widow 0.150 0.140 -0.109 -0.149
(0.308) (0.303) (0.321) (0.279)
Divorced -0.420 -0.0878 -0.238 -0.0190
(1.624) (1.212) (1.261) (0.846)
Married 0.636** 0.643*** 0.702*** 0.594***
(0.255) (0.241) (0.238) (0.195)
Cohabitant 0.254 0.258 0.525** 0.423**
(0.286) (0.273) (0.262) (0.215)
Toilette 0.0356 0.0339 0.283 0.246
(0.232) (0.235) (0.214) (0.192)
CeramicFloor -0.218 -0.179 -0.148 -0.138
(0.233) (0.228) (0.202) (0.185)
BrickFinished 0.0437 0.0927 0.132 0.161
(0.200) (0.203) (0.175) (0.167)
Savings 0.0000407 0.0000256 0.0000329 0.00000648
(0.000103) (0.000101) (0.000105) (0 .0000934)
JobExp -0.00240 -0.00409 0.00257 -0.000134
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0102) (0.00916)
Bedrooms 0.173 0.154 0.0837 0.0573
(0.115) (0.114) (0.112) (0.0998)
S. Brigida -0.0317 -0.0264 -0.00229 0.00221
(0.189) (0.194) (0.180) (0.161)
Schooling -0.0958*** -0.106*** -0.0753** -0.0818***
(0.0365) (0.0382) (0.0317) (0.0292)
HIncome 0.00000868 0.0000134 0.0000169 0.0000223
(0.0000159) (0.0000182) (0.0000146) (0.0000174)
HComponents -0.0201 -0.00901 0.0145 0.0298
(0.0726) (0.0662) (0.0701) (0.0593)
CreditCycle 0.0377** 0.0344** 0.0188* 0.0153*
(0.0170) (0.0149) (0.00980) (0.00879)
Observations 150 150 209 209
R-squared 0.220 0.0834 0.153 0.0549
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.125
Table 6. Quantitative effects of microfinance participation on life satisfaction
Prob. LifeSatisfaction = 10 Marginal effects 







Effect of a unit change in the regressors on the probability of declaring the highest level of life satisfaction
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1